Cartoon meaning google


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This essay examines contemporary liberal theory in light of the 12 cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad, first published in the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten. The objective is both to show the limits of liberal theory, in particular with regard to constituents who do not share liberalism's view of acceptable harm, and to discuss how these limits give us reason to supplement liberal theory with other recourses from critical theory and phenomenology.

The essay warns against a bifurcation of law and harm, and instead argues for a pluralization of the possible links between them. To this end, the essay foregrounds what T. The essay tracks this possibility in relation to the plurality and energy intrinsic to the 12 Jyllands-Posten cartoons, and suggests that liberal theory can learn from thinkers such as Merleau-Ponty and Deleuze who focus on the variable impacts and framings of free speech. The upshot is a self-critical theory of free expression, one that links harmful speech to the affirmation of mutual contestation, social equality and respect for difference.

Rose's efforts let to a diverse set of cartoons. The most notorious one was a cartoon of the Prophet with a detonated bomb in his turban. Another showed him as a next-door-neighbor circled by a half crescent suggesting both a halo and horns. Still another rejected the idea behind the Rose initiative and instead drew the Prophet as a seventh-grader at Valby Skole, a school outside Copenhagen known for its many Muslim immigrants.

Statements like this one anticipated the warlike conflicts that followed. Whereas Muslims in Denmark and around the world protested the cartoons, claiming they were harmed by them, others saw the cartoons as a legitimate exercise of the right to free speech.

This article explores the framing of these positions in contemporary liberal theory. The objective is both to show the limits of liberal theory, in particular with regard to constituents who do not share liberalism's view of acceptable harm, and to discuss how these limits give us reason to supplement liberal theory with other resources from critical theory and phenomenology. So far the literature has framed reactions to the cartoons in terms of the legal limits of free speech versus sensitivity to harm.

Both positions expressed something essential about the liberal theory of free expression. One might even say that both Modood and Hansen were right: The cartoons showed we need more sensitivity to harm which typically involves more regulation of free speech and we need to be resilient and embrace disagreement which typically involves less regulation of free speech.

In this essay, I push past this binary to argue for a pluralization of the possible links between harm and law. The motivation for this approach follows from the sense of intractability that characterized the first wave of interventions. Modood and Hansen saw their positions as mutually exclusive. And neither seemed interested in exploring each other's blind spots, setting the stage for a further bifurcation of the debate.

The first theoretical responses to the cartoons thus reflected and may even have contributed further to the intractability that characterized the Danish cartoon war from the outset. Rather than explore the interplay between harm and law, theorists took sides and neglected the idea that to regulate harm through legal procedures is to use instruments that are themselves shaped by certain perceptions of harm.

Footnote 1. Why this intractability and how might we negotiate it in ways that expand rather than shrink free speech? The answer, I suggest, lies in how liberal theory frames freedom of expression in terms of a choice between law and harm. Footnote 2 This framing has significant implications for how liberalism works in the context of deep pluralism. On the one hand, the frame enables liberalism to define a limited set of expressions as harmful and therefore to elide the diverse lived experiences of various groups.

Scanlon attributes to liberal rights and that actually works to energize practices of free speech within and across social divides. Both outcomes encourage us to return to the plurality and energy intrinsic to the 12 Jyllands-Posten cartoons, and to explore what the liberal theory of free expression might learn from thinkers such as Merleau-Ponty and Deleuze who focus on the variable impacts and framings of free speech.

The upshot, I argue, is a pluralization of harm and law that enables a self-critical theory of free expression, linking harmful speech to something like Scanlon's creative instability: To the affirmation of mutual contestation, social equality and respect for difference.

This, then, is the approach taken here: to rework the liberal theory of free expression from within, supplementing it with heretofore unappreciated resources of liberal theory and adding in elements of both critical theory and phenomenology. The first half of the article contextualizes the cartoon war before it develops a critique of liberalism as a frame that allocates the recognition of harm unequally. The second half focuses on the creative instability embedded in the liberal theory of free expression in order to propose another framing.

I conclude with some remarks on liberalism and the future of free speech. To avoid this mistake, we must broaden our perspective and analyze how and why the cartoons could seem harmful to some and not others. One explanation might be Islam's prohibition of images.

But this reading overlooks how the ban is perceived variously by Muslims because it belongs to a more general hadith through which a chain of transmitters called isnad communicates texts called matm combining the words and deeds of the Prophet or some other religious authority. The hadith leaves the ban open to interpretation. First, images were used on coins in the second half of the seventh century, on official landmarks, and at places of worship such as the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem and the Great Mosque of Damascus Grabar, , pp.

Even though these uses only represent minority practices within the Muslim world, they nonetheless suggest an openness that draws Islam's ban on images into a more pluralistic world delimited by processes of politicization and retextualization. Footnote 3 Because liberals rarely attend to such experiential variety, their responses to the cartoons may have contributed to rather than alleviated the sense of intractability and bifurcation that followed.

But if the hadith alone does not explain why Muslims would see the cartoons as harmful, then what made them seem so? One contributing factor might have been the emergence of a populist discourse based on moral binaries, attachment to victimization and stigmatization of minorities — what we, in a Nietzschean vein, could call a culture of ressentiment.

Founded in by four dissenters from the far-right Progress Party, the DPP is currently Denmark's third largest party. Feeding off an effective media strategy, this advocacy has empowered a stigmatizing discourse in which Muslims are perceived to be a threat to the future of Danish culture.

Muslims living in Denmark note this perception and relate it to the publication of the 12 cartoons. Although the cartoon war touched on more than sketched here, comments like these show how perceptions of harmful speech set the parameters for law and public culture within and across social divides.

The parameters are never uniform in nature, something that was especially evident in the Danish case: Whereas a majority of Muslims saw the harm provoked by the Jyllands-Posten cartoons as a reason for regulating speech through law, the opposite could be said of constituents committed to values promoted by especially the DPP.

Such contested, multiple perspectives challenge the liberal theory of free expression, which aims to be universally inclusive and above the fray. For these reasons, it may fail to appeal to constituents who do not share its framing of harm, law and free speech.

Perhaps the question is not if liberalism frames harm unequally, but rather how and with what consequences for issues of contestation, intelligibility and recognition. There is no way to assess this question without acknowledging liberalism as a rich and diverse tradition, which invokes a number of distinctions to ensure a robust commitment to free speech, focusing on the object self-regarding versus other-regarding , the character physical versus emotional and the intensity trivial versus non-trivial of the harms in question.

Footnote 4 Entrenched in the legal procedures and cultural mores of most Western democracies, these distinctions have become second-nature to many liberals. According to T. Privileging this definition, Scanlon argues, allows liberalism to decide the limits of free speech by appealing to a general quality that all reasonable persons possess — that is, personal autonomy — avoiding the fluctuating and unstable nature of harm.

This claim is more controversial than it first appears: Curled up inside it is a set of norms autonomy, proceduralism and sovereignty that citizens must internalize before they can determine the limits of harmful speech.

The issue here is one of what Butler a , p. Separating harm and law, why do liberals privilege some scheme of knowledge over others? And how might these schemes recognize some but not other modes of speech as being particularly problematic, thereby legitimizing certain practices of power and privilege?

Such questions might lead us to assess the cultural differences between Western and non-Western conceptions of free speech. Both responses enable a more nuanced and complex picture than the one currently envisioned by liberal theory and its critics. In the Danish case, for example, we find that while most Muslims emphasized the harm caused by a defaming mockery of the Prophet, the majority of Danes focused on the harm caused by flag burnings, death threats and assaults on embassy buildings, all performed by or associated with the immigrant community.

Moreover, to those who sided with Jyllands-Posten , the reaction against the cartoons seemed thin-skinned. Those on the other side did not see it that way. With the focus on the harm already done by the cartoons, decisions such as the one by the Danish government not to meet with ambassadors from the Middle East seemed only to deepen the wound.

Statements like these underscore a deep ambiguity in contemporary liberalism: On the one hand, it seems that liberalism can be co-opted by multiple constituents, each of which seeks to formulate their claim for recognition in ways that seem intelligible to the other side, refusing a neat separation of law and harm in an effort to call on liberalism to be creative and more responsive to context. On the other hand, however, liberals also insist that there has to be a way of limiting this creativity by grounding it in a universal principle that appeals and therefore seems legitimate to everyone involved.

It is in this regard that liberalism's reliance on personal autonomy proves politically inadequate. Indeed, each side of the Danish cartoon war can adopt the principle of autonomy for its own purposes, engendering an undecidability that unsettles most liberals. Whereas Muslims can see the defamation of the Prophet as a threat to their autonomy, which suffers because of the discrimination implied by equating Islam with terrorism, Danes can see the assaults on embassies as a politics of fear that short-circuits an independent consideration of the 12 cartoons.

To the extent that both of these interpretations are valid, liberalism remains less decisive than it seeks to be, limited instead to a frame in competition with others. It turns out that the creative instability endorsed by Scanlon as an aspect of liberal rights goes all the way down. To be sure, in a case like the Danish cartoon war, the possibilities for contestation are never distributed evenly.

Constituents for whom liberalism's conceptions of intelligibility and recognizability seem unproblematic are favored. Scanlon highlights this problem when he introduces a consequentialist consideration to adjudicate cases where unlimited free speech has unacceptable consequences Scanlon, b , p.

The move to consequences is a good one, but it requires that we attend to actual political contestation, since the attempt to judge harm independently of its significance for the parties involved tends to create a backlash in which government officials add insult to injury by privileging one set of impermissible harms over another set.

This problem arose when the Danish government claimed it was neutral in its indifference to the cartoons. In so doing, the government favored the Danish majority's conception of harm, augmenting the harm caused by the defamation of the Prophet.

I highlight these points to show how the liberal frame's separation of harm and law implicates it in the intractability it seeks to attenuate. The frame does so because it abstracts from the perceptions and affects that animate free speech, and because it distributes the recognition of harm unequally in order to limit a practice of contestation that liberalism at its very best seeks to promote.

It is Scanlon, rather than Rawls and Habermas , who enables us to undo this impasse. Scanlon notes that empirical beliefs are subject to change because they rely on context-dependent encounters with the consequences that follow from implementing the right to free expression in this or that way.

The turn to creative instability holds great promise. Striking an almost poetic chord, the term indicates that there are other resources in the liberal canon that we can use to frame harm differently, and thus avoid the bifurcation of harm and law that currently characterizes the debate.

How does the incompleteness of perception motivate citizens to act? What role does the encounter with harm play in the link between perception, affect and action? How do these registers shape the citizenry's appreciation of harmful speech? To address these questions, I now turn to Merleau-Ponty, who may help supplement some of these underappreciated possibilities in contemporary liberal theory.

Unlike Scanlon who begins with the assumption of personal autonomy, Merleau-Ponty begins his inquiry by examining the heteronomy intrinsic to perception.

Footnote 5 Imagine a person looking at a painting. This paradox, Merleau-Ponty argues, creates an ongoing oscillation between depth and surface and, by extension, between richness and anxiety. For even as the depth of perception hints at how rich a person's experience of a painting can be, it also undermines the thesis of picture-perfect images defined by clear lines of demarcation between the perceiver and the perceived, engendering an anxiety that may encourage the perceived to reduce or even eliminate the very richness of perception.

Footnote 6 What we have, then, are tree elements that jointly define perception: a thesis of picture-perfect images that expects the perceived world to appear as an unbroken text; a depth that enables the perceiver and the perceived to slip in and out of each other; and an enriching as well as anxiety-inducing difference, one subject to affirmation or disavowal. What makes this analysis relevant to liberal theory is the fact that it, too, encourages us to see freedom of expression in the context of creative instability.

To this quality, Merleau-Ponty adds a scheme of intelligibility and recognizability that paves the way for a more nuanced understanding of the interplay between harm and law. On the one hand, we can now speak of harm as arising from perception's inability to fulfill its own thesis of picture-perfect images.

This is what the anxiety mentioned above is about. On the other hand, we can also speak of harm as emerging along a continuum of outcomes, each of which points to what Merleau-Ponty , p.


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cartoon · 1 (in newspaper etc) viñeta (f); chiste (m); (comic strip) historieta (f) · 2 (Art) (sketch for fresco etc) cartón (m) · 3 (Cine) (TV) dibujos (m).

cartoon in Kannada ಕನ್ನಡ

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Freedom of expression in an age of cartoon wars

cartoon meaning google

These example sentences are selected automatically from various online news sources to reflect current usage of the word 'cartoon. Send us feedback. Italian cartone pasteboard, cartoon, augmentative of carta leaf of paper — more at card entry 1. See more words from the same year.

An animation group is a group of animations that appear to be related to each other. Currently, the web has no real concept of a group animation, so motion designers and developers have to compose and time individual animations so that they appear to be one coherent visual effect.

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Presentations don't have to be a series of static slides. You can add animations to objects on slides or transitions to entire slides. A transition can be as simple as fading to the next slide, or it can be a more flashy effect. Any object can be animated , making it move or fade in or out of the slide. Google Slides makes it easy to apply these effects to some or all of your slides, adding emphasis or polish to your presentation.

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Cartoon library, fully catalogued and searchable, instant downloads.

cartoon translated to Malay

The comedian talks about the challenges of animating his sprawling conversations for The Midnight Gospel. But as Trussell explains, it takes a lot of work to turn 90 minutes of audio into a minute cartoon. What were the big questions you had while getting started on the show?

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People see this as strict reading order, it's not. Paraphrasing Dark, "They're more like guidelines than actual rules". Cartoon Dog is a creature created by Trevor Henderson and, along with Cartoon Cat , the only known member of the Cartoon species. The first image depicts the creature with a muzzle and floppy ears, which represent those of a typical dog shows in cartoons. The creature seems to have its limbs swapped , jet black, huge eyes, crooked teeth, and stretchy limbs ending in white-gloved hands- but its head is more dog-like or mouse-like in shape.

Nutrition Journal volume 19 , Article number: 43 Cite this article. Metrics details.

Japanese anime is different from cartoons. While both are caricatures that may be animated, anime usually has visually distinct features for characters, and a more "limited animation" style for depicting movement. Anime illustrations are known to be exaggerated as far as physical features are concerned. Usually, one can differentiate anime from a cartoon by observing the physical traits of the characters. Anime characters include "large eyes, big hair and elongated limbs" and — in the case of manga anime comics — "dramatically shaped speech bubbles, speed lines and onomatopoeic, exclamatory typography.

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